Implementation of Phase 1 of the Road Map

Background and Monitoring Recommendations

for Provisions Concerning Human Rights

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Security

Actions Undermining Trust

At the outset of Phase I, as part of the security arrangements, the Road Map requires that the government of Israel “takes no actions undermining trust” and lists actions that come within this rubric. Some of these actions were already prohibited in the recommendations of the Mitchell Committee and in the Tenet Work Plan.

The actions listed constitute human rights violations that Israel is currently committing in the Occupied Territories, in violation of norms enshrined in international law and international conventions that Israel has signed. These violations are not isolated incidents but rather part of government and military policy. Ending these actions requires an understanding of the relevant policies that allow the violations to take place.

Attacks on civilians

The Road Map requires Israel to refrain from “attacks on civilians.” This requirement is made against the backdrop of the substantial number of civilians killed by Israeli security forces during the al-Aqsa Intifada. From September 29, 2000 to the end of May 2003, Israeli security forces killed 2,099 Palestinians, 381 of whom were under the age of eighteen. Hundreds of those killed were unarmed civilians.

In some cases, Israel deliberately killed civilians as part of its declared policy of assassinations. However, in the vast majority of cases there was no intent to kill civilians. Instead, most Palestinians were killed as a result of Israel’s “trigger happy” attitude and the IDF’s policy of impunity. If attacks on civilians are to be reduced, Israel must change these two policies.

Rules of Engagement

With the beginning of the “al-Aqsa intifada” in September 2000, the IDF defined the events in the Occupied Territories as “an armed conflict short of war.” This sweeping definition does not accord with the reality in the Occupied Territories. Alongside armed clashes, the security forces continue to conduct normal policing actions as they did prior to the current intifada. This includes dispersing demonstrations, conducting arrests and operating checkpoints.

International standards applicable to such policing actions allow the security forces to use
lethal force only in immediate and actual life-threatening circumstances, and then only to the
dergee necessary under the circumstances, and only when less severe means do not succeed in
eliminating the danger. In contrast, the IDF’s rules of engagement allow lethal fire in non-
combat situations even when human life is not in danger.

For example, Israel’s security forces are equipped only with tear gas and rubber-coated metal
bullets to disperse stone-throwers. The latter can be a lethal weapon and have already killed
and seriously injured dozens of Palestinians. Despite the fact that a wide variety of non-lethal
crowd control means are available, and that the IDF has had to confront Palestinian
demonstrators for years, Israel has failed to develop or purchase these non-lethal means in
order to reduce the number of Palestinian casualties.

Another problematic component of the IDF’s rules of engagement is the order allowing
soldiers to fire at any Palestinian who approaches certain areas in the Occupied Territories,
primarily in the Gaza Strip. These areas are generally IDF bases, settlements, roads used by
Israelis, and the separation fence between the Gaza Strip and Israel. The directive to open fire
at anyone approaching a “danger zone” entails a very real possibility that innocent people will
be injured. The situation in the Gaza Strip – where army bases and settlements are located in
the heart of densely populated Palestinian areas and the army does not mark the boundaries of
the bases and settlements – makes this directive especially dangerous. This directive also
completely ignores the fact that many Palestinians try to sneak into Israel to work and do not
pose a threat to Israeli soldiers or civilians.

When hostilities are taking place in the Occupied Territories, Israel is obligated to act
according to principles of international humanitarian law, pursuant to which the parties must
distinguish between individuals who are not taking part in the hostilities and those who are,
and between civilian objectives and military objectives. The presence of non-civilians among
a civilian population does not deny the civilians their protections; combatants also have the
duty to protect civilians in such situations. One of the reasons for the high number of civilians
killed and wounded during the hostilities is the failure of the rules of engagement to strictly
enforce this distinction.

Furthermore, the IDF’s open-fire policy makes almost no distinction between provisions that
apply during policing actions and those applying during hostilities. To reduce attacks on
civilians, the rules of engagement must sharpen this distinction, and it is crucial that the
command echelon explain this distinction to all members of the security forces serving in the Occupied Territories.

Hundreds of Palestinians have been killed as a result of Israel’s rules of engagement, yet the policy remains the same. For this reason, the fact that Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories is not aimed at intentionally killing Palestinians does not reduce the defense establishment’s culpability for these deaths. The many killings by IDF gunfire cannot reasonably be perceived as “unfortunate accidents.” Rather, they are clear proof of the danger inherent in Israel’s regulations and of the need to change them.

Accountability and Military Impunity
At the beginning of the current intifada, the IDF decided to cease its previous policy of investigating every case in which IDF soldiers kill Palestinian civilians in the Occupied Territories. According to the new policy, because an “armed conflict” is taking place in the Occupied Territories, the Judge Advocate General’s office orders an investigation only in cases in which there is a “suspicion of grave violation of the binding rules of conduct.”

Since the beginning of the current intifada, the IDF’s Military Police Investigations Unit (MPIU) has investigated relatively few cases in which security forces fired in violation of the regulations. As of the end of April 2003, only forty-five military police investigations have been opened to investigate cases in which soldiers killed or wounded Palestinians, and only six of these investigations resulted in indictments. Human rights organizations, the media, and residents of the Occupied Territories, on the other hand, have reported dozens of additional cases in which there was a strong suspicion that soldiers fired in breach of the regulations.

The Judge Advocate General’s office decides whether to open a military police investigation based on an operational debriefing conducted by the forces that were involved in the attack, who are ostensibly potential suspects. It is clearly improper to base this decision solely on the version of the potential suspects.

In cases where the Military Police Investigations Unit does open an investigation, it does not make a serious attempt to uncover the truth. In most cases, the decision to investigate is made many months, and sometimes more than a year, after the event occurred. This extended delay makes it much harder to take testimonies from witnesses and gather the relevant evidence. The investigations are generally conducted by reserve soldiers, who serve for thirty days a year. As handling of a file takes more than a month, the investigation is thus dealt with by
multiple teams of investigators. The MPIU does not have any Arabic speakers, so testimonies are rarely taken from Palestinians. As a result, investigations are based solely on soldiers’ testimonies, which clearly reduces their reliability.

The IDF’s policy regarding investigation transmits a clear message to soldiers serving in the Occupied Territories that, regardless of their behavior, there is little likelihood that they will be held accountable for their actions. This message encourages a “trigger happy” attitude and increases the number of unnecessary deaths. To make it clear to soldiers that they must comply with the law, the IDF must renew its previous policy of investigating all cases in which Palestinians are killed. Both the Mitchell Committee’s recommendations and the Tenet Work Plan called for a renewal of MPIU investigations.

**The requirement that Israel refrain from attacks on civilians must entail changes in the IDF’s rules of engagement to prohibit shooting in situations where there is no lethal danger, and an assurance that substantive investigations be carried out on a regular basis into deaths of civilians.**

**Demolition of Houses**

The Road Map states that Israel must cease demolishing houses as a punitive measure or in order to facilitate Israeli construction. In addition to houses demolished explicitly for these two reasons, Israel has also demolished hundreds of Palestinian homes under two separate but related justifications: demolition of houses ostensibly to meet “military needs” (which in some cases constitute a collective punishment); and demolition of houses built without a building permit (in some cases related to Israeli construction needs).

**Demolitions to Meet “Military Needs”**

Israel has demolished hundreds of houses and thousands of acres of farmland based on claims of “military needs.” These actions have occurred for the most part near settlements in order to provide them with greater protection, and near the Israeli-Egyptian border.

Israel destroys houses and farmland without first conducting any legal proceeding, without giving the owners an opportunity to appeal the decision, and without warning. Most of the demolitions take place at night. Some of these houses have been temporarily evacuated, at least by women and children, in response to exchanges of fire taking place in the area. In many cases, however, some occupants remain in the houses, mostly to protect their property.
Dozens of testimonies given to B’Tselem indicate that residents have fled their homes after being woken up by the sound of tanks and bulldozers at their doorstep. When they return, they find their home demolished and all their possessions buried in the rubble.

This policy of destruction constitutes a breach of international humanitarian law, which allows destruction of property only for “imperative military needs.” The scope of the destruction calls into question Israel’s contention that there was an imperative military need in each and every case. If such a need does exist, Israel still has the duty to ensure that the military advantage anticipated from the action is proportional to the harm to the civilian population. Israel’s policy of destroying houses and farmland, which has caused extensive damage to Palestinian civilians, has not met this requirement. Indeed, the Palestinians are left to suffer the consequences for many years to come.

Israel’s policy constitutes collective punishment, which is also prohibited by international law. Israel does not contend that the owners of the houses that are demolished or the orchards that are uprooted are involved in any way in attacks on Israeli soldiers or civilians. In some cases, soldiers demolish property after Palestinians attack Israeli civilians or security forces, sometimes in places distant from the site of the attack. This fact raises the likelihood that the IDF actions are intended to punish Palestinians for the attack against Israelis and to deter others from committing further attacks. Damaging property in retaliation or as punishment is patently illegal.

**Demolitions by Administrative Orders**

In the Oslo Agreements, Israel transferred powers in planning and building in Areas A and B of the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority. Although most Palestinians currently live in these areas, the only land available for expanding existing towns and villages is on the outskirts of these communities, which are in Area C. In Area C, Israel continues to prohibit Palestinian construction, and demolishes houses built without a building permit.

Israel’s planning and building policy in Palestinian communities is based on two regional outline plans that were prepared by the British Mandate in the 1940s. These plans classify most of the West Bank as farmland, on which construction is prohibited. This prohibition is the grounds for the denial of most Palestinian applications for a building permit. The Civil Administration, which is in charge of enforcing the planning and building laws in the West Bank, is responsible for issuing and implementing orders to demolish houses built without a building permit.
Having no option, many Palestinians build without a permit. These Palestinians are not making a political statement or opposing Israeli control, but are taking the only step left to them to provide adequate housing. This is the reality in which Israel has demolished dozens of houses in the West Bank over the past two years. In addition, hundreds of demolition orders have been issued but not yet executed.

**Full implementation of this section of the road map must include a cessation of all types of house demolitions, including punitive demolitions, demolitions to facilitate Israeli construction, demolitions which are ostensibly to meet “military needs,” and demolition of houses built without a building permit.**
Return to the Status Quo – Easing Palestinian Movement

As part of the security measures in Phase I, the IDF is to withdraw from “areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000.” The redeployment of IDF forces outside of Palestinian cities is an important step. However, equally important is to relieve the paralyzing restrictions Israel has placed on Palestinian movement over the past two and a half years.

Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada, IDF restrictions have brought Palestinian movement inside the West Bank almost completely to a halt. The army has set up hundreds of checkpoints, concrete blocks, dirt piles, and trenches that block most of the roads. In most villages, only one access road remains open. In a few cases, villages have been completely sealed off such that they can only be reached on foot.

Crossing the staffed checkpoints depends on the goodwill of the soldiers, who do not operate according to clear and transparent rules. The checkpoints are a constant source of friction between soldiers and the Palestinian civilian population, and a frequent site of human rights violations. Soldiers have forced Palestinians to wait many hours before allowing them to pass, confiscated identity cards, car keys, and even vehicles. In many cases, soldiers degrade Palestinians and have, at times, beaten them. In the case of physical blockage of roads, there is no soldier present to enable a vehicle’s passage in the event of an emergency.

All of the obstacles and restrictions make any journey long and arduous. Even traveling a few short kilometers may take several hours and require a circuitous route, partly on foot. The restrictions on movement affect the entire Palestinian population, and have devastated all aspects of daily life. Among other ramifications, restrictions on movement have contributed to the deteriorating economic situation including the dramatic rise in unemployment from 20% before this intifada to 50%, and an increase in the poverty level from 21% to over 60%.

One of the more serious consequences of the restrictions on movement imposed by Israel is the impaired access to medical treatment. The Israeli army claims that soldiers receive clear instructions to allow passage to Palestinians in need of urgent medical care, and deny the existence of a problem. Yet, B’Tselem has documented dozens of cases in which soldiers either did not receive these instructions, or did not obey them. Since September 2000, at least 38 Palestinians have died after Israeli soldiers delayed or denied passage at checkpoints.
While there has been some improvement recently in ambulance access, soldiers at checkpoints still do not allow passage in all medical emergencies.

Israel cannot justify its restrictions on the entire Palestinian population as legitimate security measures. Israel not only restricts the movement of those who pose a security risk, but rather the entire Palestinian population. The indiscriminate and comprehensive nature of these policies and their impact on all aspects of life for the civilian population render them a form of collective punishment, forbidden by international law.

In some areas the restrictions on movement are a direct result of Israel’s settlement policy. In many cases settlements have been intentionally constructed along major Palestinian traffic arteries in the West Bank. Restrictions on Palestinian movement are intended to ensure the free movement of Jews on roads in the Occupied Territories. The fact that these restrictions are imposed exclusively on the Palestinian population and for the benefit of the Jewish settler population constitutes flagrant discrimination.

In addition to the internal closure, several other kinds of restrictions have been imposed:

**General Closure**
A general closure has been imposed on the Occupied Territories since September 2000, prohibiting entry into Israel for any purpose. Israel has granted entry to several hundred workers on occasion, but access into Israel has been denied for the vast majority of the approximately 130,000 Palestinians who were previously employed in Israel. Throughout thirty-five years of occupation, Israel intentionally shaped the Palestinian economy to be dependent on Israel. The sudden severance of Israel as a source of employment, without creating alternative sources of employment, constitutes a major cause of the high poverty levels in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

In addition, Israel frequently closes the international border crossings. In many instances, Palestinians have been also prevented from going abroad when the crossings were open, due to many difficulties they face in reaching them.

**Curfew**
Curfew is the most sweeping and extreme restriction imposed on Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, imprisoning an entire population within the confines of their homes. Curfew is primarily imposed in locations in which Palestinians live adjacent to settlers. The most
extreme example is Hebron; the Palestinian residents of the city have been under curfew for most of the past two years. Yet during and following Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002, all population centers were placed under curfew for extended periods of time, confining residents to their homes for weeks on end with only short breaks to enable stocking up on supplies. Perhaps the most extreme case was the city of Nablus (population 160,000), which was under curfew for 109 days. The curfew was lifted for a total of 80 hours during those three and a half months.

**Safe Passage**
In October 1999, Israel opened a “safe passage” route, enabling Palestinians to travel between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. While the Oslo Accords mandated the opening of two routes, only the southern route was opened. Some 20% of Palestinians were denied passage for security reasons. However, hundreds of people used this route every day, to attend universities, reach jobs and visit family. In September 2000, this route was closed. Today Palestinians have no way to travel between these two territories, which has prevented families from meeting, halted commercial activity, and disrupted academic study.

A return to the status quo of September 28, 2000 must entail unrestricted movement within the Occupied Territories, an end to the protracted curfews and a reinstatement of the safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Settlement Freeze

The road map envisions that, in its first phase, Israel “freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements).” At least two previous bilateral understandings between Israel and the United States called for a settlement freeze: in 1978, in the Camp David Accord with Egypt, and in 1992, following the establishment of the government headed by Yitzhak Rabin. The Mitchell Committee also recommended a “settlement freeze,” and for the first time included building ostensibly intended for “natural growth” of the settlement population. On the issue of settlements, the Road Map adopts the Mitchell Committee’s recommendation.

From 1992 to the present, the settler population in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip has more than doubled. The municipal boundaries of the settlements have expanded significantly and they now comprise 6% of the area of the West Bank. Settlements control some 20% of the Gaza Strip. The extensive growth of settlements in spite of international agreements stems in part from a lack of a clear definition of “freezing of settlements,” did not require Israel to take specific measures, and did not set up any control mechanism.

To avoid a repetition of past mistakes, it is important that the Quartet consider the following points in its discussions with Israel on implementation of the settlement freeze.

Construction Freeze
The freeze on building in the settlements also requires a freeze on the following relevant legal-bureaucratic mechanisms:

**Approval of Lease Agreements** - Most of the land available for building within the municipal borders of the settlements is defined as “state land.” The use of this land requires that a lease agreement be signed with the “custodian of government property in Judea and Samaria,” an official who is part of the Civil Administration. These lease agreements do not take effect until the Ministry of Defense approves them.

**Approval of Building Plans** - Building permits in the settlements are given only after a general outline plan and a detailed plan for the settlement are approved by the Settlement Subcommittee of the Civil Administration’s Supreme Planning Council.
Issuing of Building Permits - The local governments in the settlements have planning committees empowered to issue building permits. In the years 2000, 2001, and 2002, construction began on 7,400 new housing units in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Forty-six percent of these housing starts were by private developers and the remainder by government initiatives.

Construction of New Housing - At the end of 2002, 4,100 housing units were under construction in the settlements. In addition, there may be hundreds, if not thousands, of planned housing units for which building permits have been issued but construction has not yet begun.

Economic Incentives
To keep Israelis from leaving the settlements and to encourage other Israelis to move there, Israel improves the standard of living of settlers by providing them with a range of economic benefits. For example, most of the settlements are defined as “national priority areas.” This entitles settlers to a variety of economic benefits including substantial reductions in the cost of leasing land for construction, grants to purchase an apartment and favorable mortgage terms, income tax reductions, reduced tuition in kindergartens, benefits for teachers and social workers employed in the settlements, and generous grants for investors in businesses established in the settlements.

Additionally, government ministries, primarily the Ministry of the Interior, grant larger budgets to the local governments in the settlements than to communities within Israel. By way of illustration, in 2000 the Israeli government provided the regional councils in the Occupied Territories NIS 7,200 per resident, while the per capita transfers to the regional councils within Israel amounted to NIS 3,400. These additional sums provided the settlers with a higher level of services provided by the local government.

Control Over Land for “Military Needs”
Israeli uses “military needs” to justify its control over land privately held by Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. This justification is closely linked to development of the settlements. In the 1970s, most of the land that Israel took control of for “military needs” was used to establish new settlements. The State contended that the settlements facilitated IDF activity and improved Israel’s security. In the 1990s, Israel contended that control over certain land was necessary to ensure the safety of the settlers. This contention has been manifested in the recent period in three different contexts:
Bypass Roads – Bypass roads have been built to enable settlers to travel to Israel and to other settlements without entering or passing close to Palestinian towns and villages. Israel began to build these roads during the implementation of the Oslo agreements, and their construction increased over the past three years. There are currently five bypass roads under construction. Other roads, built for military use, indirectly relate to the protection that Israel provides to the settlements.

The Separation Barrier – Israel contends that one of the primary considerations in determining the route of the barrier is to include as many settlements as possible west of the barrier in order to protect those settlements. To date, Israel has taken control of 11,000 dunams (2750 acres) for construction of the first two phases of the barrier. (See the separate section on the separation barrier).

Security Zones - Media reports have indicated that the IDF is planning to establish “special security zones” within a radius of 300 meters from the current fences of the settlements. In these zones, the army will apply relaxed open-fire regulations and will restrict the movement of Palestinians. If Israel implements this plan vis-a-vis all the settlements in the West Bank, at least 130,000 dunams (32,500 acres) will be affected. B’Tselem does not know if, or how, Israel has begun implementation of such a plan.

The following measures are necessary to ensure a freeze on all settlement activity:

- Israel must abolish the Settlement Subcommittee of the Civil Administration’s Supreme Planning Council and ensure that no other body approves outline and detailed plans.
- No new building permits should be issued, and the authority of local governments in the settlements to issue such permits should be revoked.
- The Israeli government should cancel existing building contracts in cases where construction is at an early stage (while providing appropriate compensation in the case of private developers).
- Israel should cease the policy of offering incentives to settlers and to local governments in the settlements.
- Israel must not confiscate land for the purpose of building bypass roads, construction of the separation barrier, or the establishment of new security zones around settlements.
The Separation Barrier

In June 2002, the government of Israel decided to erect a separation barrier to prevent the uncontrolled entry of Palestinians into Israel. To date, the government has directed the construction of some 190 kilometers. Stage 1 (the first 145 kilometers) is to be operational by July 2003. The route chosen for this barrier – almost entirely within the West Bank – has significant implications for any diplomatic process. The manner in which Israeli is constructing the barrier has implications for at least two commitments in the road map: a freeze on settlement activity and restoration of the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000.

Because most of the barrier will be constructed inside the West Bank, stage 1 alone will likely infringe the human rights of more than 210,000 Palestinians residing in 67 villages, towns, and cities. Thirteen communities that are home to 11,700 people, will become enclaves imprisoned between the barrier and the Green Line. The winding route of the barrier, together with the closure of areas as a result of a second barrier to the east (a depth barrier) will turn nineteen communities, in which 128,500 residents live, into isolated enclaves. Thirty-six communities east of the separation barrier or the depth barrier, in which 72,200 Palestinians reside, will be separated from substantial areas of farmland that lie west of the barrier.

The Israeli authorities have promised that crossing points will be set up along the barrier, and “special permits” issued to allow residents to cross. From the current stage of construction, it does not appear that Israel will establish all of the crossing points it has promised. In addition, the population’s dependence on Israel’s security system to obtain crossing permits will almost inevitably lead to regular harassment and decisions based on arbitrary criteria. Past experience (such as the permit system governing passage to the al-Muwasi area in the Gaza Strip) suggests that Palestinians will have great difficulty crossing the barrier, even to meet essential needs.

Thus the barrier will gravely harm the thousands of Palestinians who will have difficulty going to their fields and marketing their produce in other areas of the West Bank. The area planned for Stage 1 of the barrier is among the most productive in the entire West Bank, and farming is a primary source of income in the communities that will be affected by its construction. The harm to the farming sector is liable to have drastic economic effects on the residents and drive many families into poverty.
The erection of the barrier will also significantly reduce access of the rural population to the hospitals in Tulkarm, Qalqiliya, and East Jerusalem, which will be isolated from the rest of the West Bank. The educational system will also suffer because many teachers come from outside the community in which they teach. This is especially true in village schools.

Israel’s State Comptroller found that most of the Palestinians who perpetrated attacks in Israel entered the country through the checkpoints situated along the Green Line, and not through the open areas between the checkpoints. Thus the construction of the barrier with an additional network of checkpoints will not solve these problems. Even if we accept Israel’s claim that the only way to prevent attacks is to erect a separation barrier, Israel is required to select the route that achieves this objective with the least harm to the Palestinian population. The planned route almost totally ignores this principle and is based on illegitimate considerations.

One of the government’s primary considerations in determining the route was inclusion of as many settlements as possible west of the barrier in order to increase the likelihood of their future annexation into Israel. The authorities also determined the route of the barrier in a manner that would avoid the political problems resulting from recognition of the Green Line as the border of Israel. In one of the areas, the route was changed due to pressure by residents of the Israeli town of Matan, who demanded separation between Qalqiliya and the neighboring village of Habla, in order to safeguard their “quality of life.” In other areas, it was decided to move the barrier eastward to prevent damage to antiquities. In the area of Bethlehem, the authorities decided to erect the barrier within the city to ensure Jewish worshipers free access to Rachel’s tomb.

Israel has yet to decide on the route for the next stages of the separation barrier. However, the current proposal envisions the route extending even further into the West Bank, isolating tens of thousand of Palestinians and hundreds of thousands of dunams of land (see attached map). It is clear that this ambitious project – at an investment of several billion shekels – will constitute a permanent feature that must be reckoned with in any diplomatic process.

The route Israel has chosen for the first stage of the separation barrier is inconsistent with a freeze on all settlement activity, and will prevent a return to the status quo prior to September 2000. If Israel chooses to construct a barrier to protect its citizens, it must do so within its own territory.
For further information on the issues addressed in this document, please see the following B’Tselem reports:

**Attacks on Civilians**
- *Lethal Curfew: The Use of Live Ammunition to Enforce Curfew* (October 2002)
- *Wounded in the Field: Impeding Medical Treatment and Firing at Ambulances by IDF Soldiers in the Occupied Territories* (March 2002)

**House Demolitions**
- *Policy of Destruction: House Demolition and Destruction of Agricultural Land in the Gaza Strip* (February 2002)
- *Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank* (May 2002)
- *Demolishing Peace: Israel's Policy of Mass Demolition of Palestinian Houses in the West Bank* (September 1997)

**Restrictions on Movement**
- *Civilians Under Siege: Restrictions on Freedom of Movement as Collective Punishment* (January 2001);
- *No Way Out: Medical Implications of Israel's Siege Policy* (June 2001);
- Impeding Medical Treatment and Firing at Ambulances by IDF Soldiers in the Occupied Territories (March 2002).

**Settlements**
- *Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank* (May 2002)

**The Separation Barrier**
- *Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations As a Result of Israel's Separation Barrier* (April 2003)