

**B'Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for
Human Rights in the Occupied Territories**

To: Colonel Einat Ron
Chief Military Prosecutor
Office of the Judge Advocate
Hakiryia
Tel Aviv

16.07.01
Ref: 9563

Re: The circumstances surrounding the killing of eleven-year-old Khalil al-Mughrabi
by IDF soldiers in Rafah on 7 July 2001

Attached to this letter are testimonies given to B'Tselem's researcher regarding the killing of eleven-year-old Khalil al-Mughrabi and the wounding of two of his friends by IDF gunfire in Yubneh Refugee Camp in Rafah, near the Egyptian-Israeli border on 7 July 2001.

These testimonies indicate that the deceased was shot and killed while playing with his friends. The deceased was near an IDF post situated on the Egyptian-Israeli border, near Yubneh Refugee Camp and posed no danger to the soldiers at the post.

I request that you inform me what action has been taken thus far by the Judge Advocate's Office to prosecute the parties responsible for this child's senseless death. If no action has been taken, I request that you order an investigation of the parties involved in this terrible incident.

Sincerely,

s/

Ronen Shnayderman
B'Tselem.

The Circumstances Surrounding the Death of eleven-year-old Khalil al-Mughrabi in Rafah on 7 July, 2001.

Testimony of Suleiman Muhammad Salameh al-Akhras, born in 1988, elementary school pupil, resident of Rafah

The testimony was given to Nabil Mukhairez on 8 July 2001.

Even before the intifada, I used to play soccer with my friends around Yubneh Refugee Camp, in Rafah, close to the Egyptian border. We used to play there because there aren't any other soccer fields in the city, and because the ground is flat and made of concrete, so it's good for playing.

On Saturday [7 July], I was playing there with twenty or thirty other children between the ages of ten and thirteen. They are all friends from the neighborhood and from school. We divided into a few teams of six and played a few games in order to give all the children a chance to play. About fifteen minutes before we finished playing, an Israeli tank drove along the border. It arrived from Salah a-Din gate and drove west toward the Tel Zu'arub post, where there is a very tall military tower that overlooks the whole area. After we finished playing, we sat down to rest. Some of us sat alongside the sand piles that are near the border fence. Others sat on the top the piles. While we were resting, the soldiers in the tower suddenly shot a bullet. We didn't hear it until it entered Khalil Ibrahim Muhammad al-Mughrabi's head. Khalil, who was sitting on top of one of the piles, fell down immediately. His head burst and parts of it flew toward the children who were near him.

Then the soldiers opened intense fire from the tower. This time, the shooting was very loud. It sounded different from the bullet that hit Khalil. When we ran north, toward the houses in the refugee camp, two more of my schoolmates were hit. Ibrahim Abu Susin was hit in the stomach and his intestines came out. Suleiman Abu Rijal was hit in the thigh. A number of civilians rushed to the place immediately and evacuated the deceased in a Mercedes public-transport vehicle. An ambulance, which arrived immediately after, evacuated the two wounded to the hospital.

The terrible sight that I saw in this incident shocked me so much that I couldn't speak for six hours.

The Circumstances Surrounding the Death of eleven-year-old Khalil al-Mughrabi in Rafah on 7 July, 2001.

*Testimony of Muhammad Salah Hussein al-Akhras, born in 1987,
elementary school student, resident of Rafah*

The testimony was given to Nabil Mukhairez on 8 July, 2001

On the evening of Saturday [7 July], I was playing with about thirty more children at a soccer field near the border, in Yubneh Refugee Camp. The game started after the afternoon prayer, i.e. around 5:00 P.M. After a while, a tank drove along the border. It came from the east and drove west, toward Tel Zu'arub and the military tower there. The tank passed by quietly without shooting at us. After we finished playing, we lay on the ground to rest. Some of us sat on the piles of sand near the border. Around 7:10 P.M., I stood up and told the children to leave the place. I was two meters away from Khalil al-Mughrabi. Then I heard a faint sound and saw Khalil's brain flying out of his head and spreading all over my face and clothes. We started running away from the place. While we were running, intensive fire from the tower began. That gunfire resulted in two more children being hit. One of them was my neighbor, Ibrahim Abu Susin. He was hit in the stomach and his intestines came out. The other, Suleiman Abu Zeidan, was hit in the left thigh. Civilians who were there evacuated the deceased and the wounded to the hospital.

I spent the entire night after that dreaming about the incident, and about Khalil's brain flying in the air and splattering on my body. The morning after, I went to the sheik in al-Hoda mosque and told him the story. He started reading from the Koran and told me I had to pray and read the Koran all the time.

B'Tselem researcher Nabil Mukhairez adds:

The deceased, who was playing soccer with about ten children, was shot by a bullet that entered the top of his head and came out the bottom. The bullet was shot from the Tel Zu'arub tower, about one kilometer away from the deceased. As a result of the injury, his head shattered and parts of it fell to the ground. There was no rioting in the area. There were only children playing.

In addition, two children were wounded:

1. Ibrahim Kamal Abu Susin, 10, was struck in the abdomen by a bullet. His intestines and liver were injured, and he is in critical condition at Nasser Hospital.
2. Suleiman Turki Abu Rijal, 12, was struck in the left thigh by a bullet, which led to his left testicle being amputated.

- Sketch attached.

Appendix A

- Restricted -

Regional Brigade 6643
Operations Department
11 July 01

To: Battalion 424,229, 585 - Battalion Commander, Operations Officer
For the information of: Regional brigade 6643 - Brigade Commander, Operations Officer.
Division 643 - Commander, Operations Department Officer

Re: De-briefing Regarding to Warning Shots on the "Philadelphi" Route

1. General:

- a. On Saturday 7 July 2001, an armored personnel carrier patrol mission was carried out between opening 16a and 18, a crowd of children gathered, there was stone and grenade throwing at the armored personnel carriers.
- b. According to Palestinian reports, an eleven-year-old boy was killed and two were injured by our forces' fire.
- c. On 9 July 2001 a de-briefing was conducted by the battalion commander with the participation of the Girit Platoon Commander, Platoon Commander 5, Sergeant 5, the tank platoon commander and the operations officer.
- d. On 10 July 2001 a brigade commander de-briefing was held.

2. Facts:

- a. On Saturday, 7 July 2001, an armored personnel carrier patrol mission was carried out on the "Philadelphi" route in order to prevent hostile terrorist action on the route and to prevent weapons smuggling.
- b. At 06:00 A.M. a route opening on "Philadelphi" was carried out by two armored personnel carriers [illegible in original]
- c. [illegible in original] between RP 16a and 18.
- d. Just before 12:00 dozens of children started to gather around the opening at 18. Stones were thrown at the armored personnel carriers from the mound and the ditch.
- e. A fragmentation grenade was thrown at the force.
- f. The children tried to cross "Philadelphi" route and reached "Dakar" route. The force inside the armored personnel carrier fired warning shots - five bullets, on the "Dakar" route in front of the children.
- g. In addition, the force fired five bullets at the protective wall - cement blocks around RP 18 - in order to prevent the children from entering the ditch and throwing stones from it.
- h. At 13:00 the forces on the ground switched and Platoon Commander 5 situated himself on the lookout at the opening on RP 18 from the north.
- i. At 13:30 approximately, grenade and stone throwing at the armored personnel carrier increased. Five grenades were thrown at the personnel carrier.
- j. The platoon commander fired warning shots at the children who were attempting to cross the "Dakar" route
- k. The platoon commander fired rubber [bullets] at a group of children who were on the battery and tried to enter the ditch. The shots fired were blanks.
- l. During the firing of rubber [bullets], the platoon commander detected that one of the children was hit in the head. The child held his head and ran. After a few minutes he returned to the demonstration.

- m. In addition, a number of bullets were shot from a machine gun toward the protective wall, which is the mound and the concrete wall.
- n. The force threw a percussion grenade into the ditch.
- o. While firing the warning shots, two grenades were thrown at the force. One fell near the armored personnel carrier and one fell into the ditch.
- p. The platoon commander entered the opening at 18 with the armored personnel carrier in order to lookout onto the ditch and see if any of the children had been struck by the grenade. The platoon commander did not detect that anyone was hit.
- q. At approximately 19:00 the platoon commander left with the armored personnel carrier to go back to Girit.
- r. When the force moved out, dozens of children and adults entered the "Dakar" route, put down objects and barbed wire. In addition, sacks coming in from the Egyptian side were detected.
- s. The company commander directed the tank to fire warning shots. The tank fired a 0.5 machine gun three times: at RP 17, north of RP 17 and at the T at the opening at 18. The shots were fired within the sector, three bullets each time, a total of twelve 0.5 bullets - all west of the concrete wall.
- t. Over the course of the incident no ambulance arriving at the area was detected, nor evacuation of a child by people at the place. As well, there was no apparent change in behavior during the disturbances.

3. Mistakes.

- a. The armored personnel carriers' activity was too static and not sufficiently mobile.
- b. The children got within too close a range from the armored personnel carriers.
- c. The tank should not have been used to fire warning shots during the day. The company commander should have considered that the tank was exposed to the Egyptians during the shooting.
- d. The use of rubber was not right. The risk resulting from these shots was not considered.
- e. It was possible to return the armored vehicles to 18 instead of firing warning shots from the tank.

4. Failures:

- a. A Roger (22 caliber anti-riot rifle) that was supposed to arrive for the mission, did not arrive.
- b. The platoon commander did not transmit open-fire regulations dealing specifically with firing rubber (The platoon commander received training for firing rubber and knows how to use it. The platoon commander is aware of the 70-meter minimum range.)
- c. Rubber shots were fired using blanks and not by rifle attachments.

5. Lessons and Conclusions:

- a. Recently there has been an increase in disturbances in which children participate.
- b. Most of the disturbances take place at RP 18 because the Palestinians understand that we do not have effective weapons for that range.
- c. There is an increased use of children for the purposes of laying explosive devices, dummy devices and obstacles on the route.
- d. Daily patrols on RP 18 decreases hostile terrorist activity and disturbances on the route, but does not completely prevent them.
- e. This mission creates a high level of friction between the force and the children - which poses difficult dilemmas for the troops on the ground.

- f. It is necessary to ensure that the forces are mobile, in order to decrease the level of friction.
- g. From the de-briefing , it is not possible to determine whether a child was killed from our forces' fire.
- h. The mission is very complex and there are many difficulties in carrying it out, since the target is to keep "Philadelphi" route sterile, yet not fire shots at children.
- i. The fact that the children came within ten meters of the armored personnel carrier is a mistake. Such events should be avoided, even if it means that the personnel carrier is driven backwards in order to avoid a high level of friction.
- j. The rubber fired by the platoon commander does not deviate from the open-fire directives and regulations. However, one should realize that shooting is at least from forty meters range and is aimed at the legs. Improvised firing blanks by officers is a flaw and as a rule, firing rubber bullets, which are, in some instances deadly, should be avoided.
- k. The Roger – a Roger was ordered for the company, but it had not arrived and the company went out on its mission without it, which prevented the force from shooting accurately and safely.
- l. It is the company commander's responsibility to hold a commander conference and clarify the Open-Fire Regulations.
- m. There is no authorization for firing rubber, just a Roger.
- n. There is no doubt that Palestinians are using children for smuggling and laying devices, but shooting at children should be absolutely avoided.

6. Summary and Assessment

- a. It is impossible to unequivocally determine that the child was killed by our forces' gunfire:
 - 1. No ambulances were detected coming into the area of the events throughout the day.
 - 2. Nobody hurt was detected.
 - 3. There was no escalation and commotion that could have occurred as a result of a death during the events.

7. Respectfully,

Holi Moshe, Major,
Operations Department Officer,
Division 643

Appendix B

- Restricted -

Regional Brigade 6643
Operations Department
14 July 01

To: Battalion 424 - Battalion Commander, Operations Officer
For the Information of: Regional Brigade 6643 - Brigade Commander, Brigade Sub-Commander, War Room Officer; Division 643 - Operations Department Officer, Operations Officer

Re: Division Commander de-briefing relating to warning shots at RP 18 "Philadelphi", 7 July 2001

1. On Thursday, 12 July 2001, the above de-briefing was conducted by the division commander with the participation of the southern division deputy-commander, battalion 424 commander and operations officer.
2. Below is the division commander's summary:
 - a. The background for the de-briefing is a press report about the killing of a child and the wounding of two others in the Termit area, while they were at home. The report refers to an injury from a 0.5 bullet.
 - b. Mistakes:
 1. People should not be allowed to get within less than 50 meters from the vehicles – either by retreating or by operating a Roger (22 caliber anti-riot rifle)
 2. The tank fire is a flaw.
 - c. Open-fire guidelines for "Philadelphi"
 1. Ensure the shots do not hit - i.e. shooting toward a protective wall, west of the wall, the mound, and/or at the concrete wall, as far away as possible from people (do not set 50 meters)
 2. Shots should be fired from a precisely accurate weapon - Barret (50 caliber sniper rifle), a machine gun, a 0.5 parallel mounted on a canon, after setting the weapon's sights.
 3. Warning shots are fired during the day only, authorized by the company commander or deputy-commander only.
 - d. The patrol on "Philadelphi" should be constantly moving. Ensure it is moving and not static.
 - e. It is not possible to determine that the children were hurt by our forces' gunfire.

Moshe Holi, Major
Operations Department Officer,
Division 643

Appendix C

Restricted

Office of the Judge Advocate General
Land Forces/Southern Command
Tel: 0307-9351/4
Fax: 0307-9353
29 August 2001

JAO 9605 – The Judge Advocate General
JAO 9605 – Chief Military Prosecutor
H - 2025

Re: **The circumstances of the death of Khalil al-Mughrabi
in Rafah on 7 July 2001**

[references]

1. In addition to the letters of the Chief Military Prosecutor referred to above, we received for our review newspaper articles and a complaint from B'Tselem which indicate that on 7 July 2001, during a disturbance, which included stone and grenade throwing at IDF forces, the child Khalil al-Mughrabi was shot and killed.

According to the Palestinians, IDF soldiers used heavy machine guns. Army officials quoted in the papers denied that allegation.

B'Tselem's letter indicates that the child was not involved in violent events, but was playing nearby with his friends when he was shot and killed.

2. Recently, we received de-briefings with regards to the said incident. These de-briefings indicate that during that day there were severe disturbances and rioting at the place. According to the de-briefings, "warning shots" and rubber bullets were fired in the direction of groups of rioters composed of dozens of children who were attempting to approach an IDF force at the place and threw stones and several fragmentation grenades at the force.

These details do not conform with B'Tselem's version, according to which, at the said time, there were no violent incidents in the place, and the children who had been hit were playing ball games and not participating in any kind of disturbance.

3. In light of the circumstances of a violent disturbance and the combat nature of the events, as described in the de-briefings, I do not think that there is cause to open a Military Police investigation.
4. However, I have found it appropriate to point to the following problematic issues:
 - (A) It appears that tank fire was used as warning shots, which the regulations prohibit. The de-briefing itself specifies that the tank fire was a mistake (for reasons unrelated to the regulations). There was no mention of what measures, if any, were taken with regards to this shooting.

(B) The de-briefings mention that warning shots were fired toward the children. The regulations do stipulate that no warning shots should be fired to get children away from restricted areas on roadsides (section 9 of the Ahuda ?? Regulation). However, in light of the nature of the disturbance (stones and a number of grenades), live ammunition and warning shots could be fired and there was nothing wrong in firing the warning shots in such circumstances.

(C) It appears that the IDF response given to the press, claiming that there was no use of heavy weapons, was wrong.

5. Therefore, I do not recommend, as noted above, a Military Police investigation into the matter. However, it appears that it is necessary to check which disciplinary action has been taken against those responsible for using the tank in the incident. In the event that no such action has been taken, it should be ordered.
6. For your instruction.

Baruch Y. Mani, Lt. Colonel
Judge Advocate, Southern Command

Appendix D

The circumstances of the death of Khalil al-Mughrabi, 11, and the wounding of two children near the Egyptian border on 7 July 2001

B'Tselem's Complaint (attached, testimonies of two children)

1. On 7 July 2001, a group of twenty to thirty children were playing soccer on a field near the border, close to Yubneh Refugee Camp.
2. At about 17:00, a tank passes by them from east to west and pays no attention to them.
3. Fifteen minutes before they finished their game, the tank proceeds from Salah a-Din gate westward toward the military tower at Tel Zu'arub.
4. At 19:10 – the children sit down to rest: some alongside the sand piles near the border, some on **top** of them (among these, Khalil, the boy who was killed).
5. Suddenly, gunfire from the direction of the military tower, a kilometer away from the children: a quiet bullet hits Khalil, his head shattered and he fell from the top of the pile. Immediately afterward the sound of loud shots – when running northward, two children were hit.
6. A Mercedes public-transport vehicle picked Khalil up, and an ambulance picked up the two wounded.

Operations de-briefing.

1. An armored personnel carrier was patrolling reporting points (RP) 16a and 18, on the border.
2. At 12:00, dozens of children gathered at RP 18. The chronology of events:
 - a. 12:00, stone throwing. One fragmentation grenade is thrown at the troops. Children cross the "Philadelphi" route and reach the "Dakar" route (parallel to "Philadelphi"). **Response:** warning shots are fired on the "Dakar" route, in front of the children + five bullets toward the concrete blocks at RP 18.
 - b. 13:00 Replacement of troops – platoon commander 5 situates himself on the lookout north of RP 18.
 - c. 13:30, increased stone throwing + 5 grenades thrown at the armored personnel carrier. **Response:** platoon commander fires warning shots + rubber bullets (hits, apparently lightly, a child who continues to run and demonstrate) + machine gun fire toward a battery and a concrete wall + percussion grenade into the ditch. Two grenades are thrown at the force.
 - d. 19:00, the platoon commander and the armored personnel carrier return westward to Girit. Dozens of children and adults enter the "Dakar" route, put down objects and barbed wire + bags coming from the Egyptian side were detected. **Response:** the platoon commander instructs the tank to fire warning shots – not toward the children themselves. A 0.5 machine gun was fired in three directions: RP

17, north of RP 17 toward the T in the opening at RP 18. No detection of children being hurt.

Recommendation of Southern [Command] Judge Advocate

1. Violent disturbance, combat nature, grenades were thrown – Military Police investigation unnecessary.
2. However, it is prohibited to use tank fire as warning shots – recommend disciplinary action against those responsible for operating the tank.

Response of the Chief Military Prosecutor

Examination of the event should be divided in two: a. An examination of the legality of the tank fire. b. Did this fire cause the death and injury of the complainants?

1. The legality of the shooting

It appears that the shooting was indeed done during a “combat” incident, grenades were thrown etc. However:

- a. There is no connection, either in timing or substance, between the grenades and the shots fired from the heavy machine gun on the tank. Prior shots during that day were fired as a response to grenades, **not** the tank fire at 19:00.
- b. The tank fire was shot in response to dozens of children and adults who arrived at the "Dakar" route and put down objects, in the words of the de-briefing.
- c. Shots were fired as warning - and not in order to hit. It is doubtful that the force felt that it was in a life-threatening situation.
- d. Warning shots – the regulations stipulate that:
 1. No warning shots should be fired at children.
 2. Warning shots should only be fired from light weapons (certainly not from heavy sub-machine guns)

In this matter, the de-briefing does not examine which regulations regarding warning shots were known to the troops, in general, and to the platoon commander who operated the tank, in particular.

The Southern [Command] Judge Advocate was aware of the problems surrounding the legality of the warning shots, yet advised that disciplinary action against those responsible for using the tank would suffice. He made this conclusion because grenades were also thrown. Therefore, “It was permitted to fire live ammunition, and warning shots are acceptable under such circumstance.” See 4b in the judge advocate’s letter.

As demonstrated, a *doubt* exists whether the tank fire could be justified by the grenade throwing (which does not correspond in terms of timing), or in the force’s feeling that it was in a life-threatening situation.

2 Was the tank fire the cause of injury and death of the complainants

First, it is likely that the shots did not hit the children who were identified as rioters but rather children who were some distance from the place of the event.

- a. The children indicated that there were no violent events in the area.
- b. The children indicated that the tank passed by them at around 17:00, paid no attention to them and moved toward the military tower at Tel Zu'arub.
- c. From the complaint, it appears that the gunfire came from the military tower, which was about a kilometer away from them.
- d. The de-briefing indicated that no injury was detected, there was no commotion following an injury, there was neither an ambulance nor some other vehicle which evacuated the casualties. However, the children indicated that a Mercedes public-transport vehicle picked up the deceased and an ambulance picked up the wounded.
- e. The shots were not fired in the direction of the rioters, but to the side.
- f. The children were sitting by the side of the sand piles and some on the top of the piles.

Was there no other gunfire that hit the soccer children?

- a. The hours correspond - 19:10 according to the children, around 19:00 according to the de-briefing, the platoon commander goes back to Girit and the rioters arrive at the route, etc.
- b. The location is in close proximity
- c. From the de-briefing it appears that there was no other gunfire in the sector

Interim Summary

1. If there were warning shots - they were fired against regulations - only light weapons and not toward children.
2. Shooting in order to remove a life-threatening danger - there is a doubt whether live gunfire in order to hit could have been justified at that point (the relevant time - 19:00, when no grenades were thrown, and it is doubtful that the force felt its life was in danger).
3. It is likely, though not unequivocal (at this stage) that the allegedly illegitimate warning shots hit the soccer children, a distance of about 1000 meters from the place of the incident.

Options for Action

1. There is suspicion of firing in violation of the regulations + suspicion that the gunfire killed and wounded innocent children. A thorough Military Police investigation should be ordered (among the matters to be examined are which open-fire directives were given to the force and whether it could be positively determined that it was that gunfire that struck the children).
2. The shooting was justified - the incident as a whole had a combat nature, grenades were thrown earlier during in the day, the whole area is dangerous, the gunfire was justified, if innocent people were harmed, one can only regret it. See the proposal for a reply letter to B'Tselem, derived from choosing this alternative.
3. Despite the combat nature - the shots were warning shots - which were not fired according to regulations: they were fired from a heavy machine gun and not light weapons and toward children. However, in light of the confrontation, the grenades, the

danger etc. it is not a “gross deviation” from regulations and disciplinary action against whoever fired warning shots from the tank should suffice.

Difficulties in selecting the middle way.

1. The "gravity of the deviation" and the "results of the event" are two corresponding criteria. The results here are very serious - an eleven-year-old child, who was innocently playing soccer, was killed. His two friends, 10 and 12, were injured (the ten-year-old apparently "severely"). Even if it is a "slight" deviation, the result should dictate a Military Police investigation.
2. The limitation allowing only light-weapons fire is to ensure that warning shots will pose as little danger as possible. The use of a heavy machine gun greatly increased the risk that someone 1000 meters away would get hurt.
3. If all the alleged suspicions are verified - firing warning shots against regulations + causal connection to death - an indictment won't be filed?
4. Perhaps the answer to the question on filing an indictment depends on which open-fire orders were given to the force when it went out on its mission?

Office of the Chief Military Advocate
Chief Military Prosecutor
Telephone: 03-5693153
12 September 2001

Ronen Stein - B'Tselem
8 Hata'asiya St.
Jerusalem 93420

Re: **Your letter regarding the circumstances of the**
death of Khalil al-Mughrabi in Rafah on 7 July 2001
Ref: Your letter from 16 July 2001.

1. An examination of the circumstances surrounding the incident indicates that on 7 July 2001, children gathered near an IDF force that was moving along the Egyptian border. While the gathering took place, stones and fragmentation grenades were thrown at the IDF force.
2. The force tried to disperse the disturbance using rubber bullets and warning shots, which were aimed at a protective wall, so as not to hurt the rioters.
3. Under the circumstance and in light of the fact that the IDF force was subject to fragmentation grenade throwing, we have not found a suspicion of criminal behavior on the part of the IDF soldiers, or that there is just cause to open an investigation.

Copy: Southern [Command] Judge Advocate

Sincerely,

s/

Einat Ron, Colonel
Chief Military Prosecutor

Appendix E

Office of the Chief Military Prosecutor
Chief Military Prosecutor
Telephone: 03-5693153
12 September 2001

Ronen Stein - "B'Tselem"
8 Hata'asiya St.
Jerusalem 93420

**Re: Your letter regarding the circumstances of the death
of Khalil al-Mughrabi in Rafah on 7 July 2001**

Ref: Your letter of 16 July 2001.

1. Following an examination of the circumstances surrounding the incident, there is an indication that on 7 July 2001, children and, at some stages, adults gathered near an IDF force that was moving along the Egyptian border.
2. At certain points during this gathering, there were massive stone throwing and throwing of fragmentation grenades at the IDF force.
3. The force tried to disperse the disturbance using rubber bullets and warning shots, which were aimed at a protective wall, so as not to hurt the rioters.
4. Live gunfire was not aimed at the rioters, and no hits were detected as a result of this gunfire.
5. Under the circumstances, we have not found any suspicion of criminal behavior on the part of the IDF soldiers, or that there is just cause to open an investigation.

Copy: Southern [Command] Judge Advocate

Sincerely,

s/

Einat Ron, Colonel
Chief Military Prosecutor